What happens the morning after a populist government is voted out? For the global pro-democracy movement, the assumption has often been that the rule of law simply snaps back into place like a reset spring once the “bad actors” are removed. In Poland, Prime Minister Donald Tusk famously distilled this optimism into a “24-hour” promise to turn party propaganda back into public service media.
The reality, however, has been a sobering “post-illiberal hangover.” Poland has become the global canary in the coal mine, illustrating that “restoration” is not a single event but a gruelling, often contradictory process. One year into the reboot, the country is a landscape of “institutional traps,” “pretext-hunting,” and a profound “legal dualism” that threatens to break the very system it intends to fix.
As other nations look to Poland for a blueprint on democratic resilience, they must first confront five uncomfortable lessons from the Polish “iron broom.”
The Post-Illiberal Trilemma: You Can Only Pick Two
According to a seminal analysis in the Journal of Democracy, any reforming government attempting to undo systemic backsliding faces a structural “trilemma.” In an ideal world, the restoration of democracy would be simultaneous in three areas, but in practice, a government can usually only achieve two at once:
• Swiftness: Responding to the urgent mandate for change.
• Efficacy: Truly dismantling captured structures so they cannot be weaponised again.
• Unimpeachable Legality: Adhering strictly to every procedural norm and constitutional limit.
This is the ultimate institutional landmine. If a government acts legally but slowly, it risks “demobilising” supporters who demand immediate justice, allowing captured institutions to stall progress indefinitely. However, acting swiftly and effectively often necessitates “militant” methods—using executive power to bypass stalled courts or hostile vetos—that mirror the populist playbook. Poland’s experience suggests that “cleaning up” an illiberal legacy almost inevitably requires a compromise on at least one corner of this triangle.
From “Propaganda Soup” to “Clean Water” is a Dangerous Rinse
The takeover of the public broadcaster TVP serves as the primary case study for the messiness of reform. Under the previous Law and Justice (PiS) government, TVP was transformed into a taxpayer-funded propaganda machine. To reclaim it, the Tusk government bypassed the PiS-controlled National Media Council (NMC) by putting the broadcaster into “liquidation.” This manoeuvre allowed the Ministry of Culture to appoint new management as a form of compulsory administration.
Instead of propaganda soup, we want to offer you clean water.” — Marek Czyż, 19:30 news presenter
While the new programming is objectively more balanced, the “iron broom” strategy had unintended geopolitical consequences. Nielsen data showed that the rebooted 19:30 news program captured barely half the audience share of the old program. This “talent drain” and audience migration fuelled a massive rise in right-wing alternatives like TV Republika, whose share nearly doubled. By attempting to “clean the water,” the government inadvertently deepened the country’s polarisation, pushing nearly half the audience into an even more radicalised media silo—a migration that would ultimately prove fatal in the 2025 elections.
”Militant Democracy”: Using the Poison to Create the Antidote?
One of the most controversial aspects of the Polish reboot is the shift toward “militant democracy.” This concept justifies “decisionist” methods—bending existing rules to remove illiberal influence—on the grounds that the democratic end justifies the means. This has created a rift between two factions:
• The Doves: Legal purists, like Justice Minister Adam Bodnar, who argue for “legalism and legal certainty” to avoid replicating the illiberal modus operandi.
• The Hawks: Judicial associations like Iustitia who demand a swift “de-PiSification,” arguing that proceduralism only protects the captors.
Tusk eventually leaned toward the Hawks, invoking the need for a “Militant Rule of Law” to justify actions that might be “inconsistent with the letter of the law” in order to restore its spirit.
It might be necessary to commit actions that may be inconsistent with the letter of the law to achieve the rule of law writ large.” — Donald Tusk
This shift reflects a broader public appetite for “majoritarian decisionism.” Survey data indicates that 17.4% of Tusk’s supporters are willing to accept “swift and effective” action even if it is not “unambiguously legal.”
The “Neo-Judge” Siege and Legal Dualism
The most intractable trap is the state of the judiciary. Since 2017, approximately 2,500 judges—known as “neo-judges”—were appointed via a politicised National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ). This has resulted in a state of “legal dualism” where different parts of the government and judiciary simply refuse to recognise each other’s authority.
This has created a “legal black hole”:
• The Constitutional Tribunal issues rulings that the government ignores, claiming the court is illegitimately composed of “duplicates.”
• The Supreme Court is split, with the PiS-created Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs issuing rulings that the government and European courts (CJEU) increasingly dismiss as non-existent.
• President Duda uses his veto and the threat of the Constitutional Tribunal to stall the government’s “Action Plan” for the rule of law.
Until the status of these 2,500 judges is resolved, every verdict they hand down remains a potential point of future legal collapse.
The Verdict of the 2025 “Midterm”
The ultimate cost of the “trilemma” was revealed during the May/June 2025 presidential elections. Despite high hopes, the government-backed candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski, was narrowly defeated by the radical-right newcomer Karol Nawrocki. The margin was a razor-thin 50.9% to 49.1%.
This defeat was a referendum on the Tusk government’s first year. Paralysed by the trilemma, the coalition was unable to deliver on its “100 promises” due to the constant stalemate with the presidency and captured courts. Furthermore, the “coup d’état” rhetoric surrounding the attempt to block the new president’s swearing-in—suggested by the Speaker of the Sejm—underscored the fragility of the transition. The loss suggests that if a pro-democracy government cannot navigate institutional traps effectively, it risks a “rebound” where the public returns to populists out of frustration with a “messy” and ineffective restoration.
Conclusion: The Long Journey Home
Poland’s experience reveals that “deprogramming” a state from populism is an arduous journey, not a single election night victory. While “militant” methods may seem like the only way to break through institutional capture in the short term, they carry a long-term risk: embedding “Schmittean logic”—the idea that the leader decides on the exception—as a permanent feature of the political system. By using illiberal tools to save democracy, the reformers risk breaking the very guardrails they sought to protect.
As other nations watch Poland’s struggle, they are left with a haunting question:
In the fight to save a democracy, is it ever truly possible to use the tools of the illiberal without becoming one yourself?
Bibliography
- Bill, Stanley, and Ben Stanley. “Democracy After Illiberalism: A Warning from Poland.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 36, no. 3, July 2025, pp. 16–32.
- Chapman, Annabelle. “Poland: Media freedom reform faces obstacles after opposition victory.” ipi.media, International Press Institute, 31 Oct. 2023.
- Csaky, Zselyke. “The difficulties of restoring democracy in Poland.” Insight, Centre for European Reform, 17 Dec. 2024.
- Freedom House. “Poland: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report.” Freedom House, 2025.
- Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2025: Poland.” Human Rights Watch, 2025.
- Johnson, Luke. “After eight years of propaganda, can Polish journalists regain public trust?” Columbia Journalism Review, 13 May 2024.
- “The Post-Illiberal Hangover: How to Restore Media Pluralism in Poland.” Journalism Funders Forum, Philanthropy Europe Association – Philea, 2025.
- Romanowski, Marcin. “Dismantling Electoral Safeguards in Poland under Tusk’s Government.” The Institute of World Politics, 14 Oct. 2025.
- Wójcik, Anna. “Rebuilding the Rule of Law in Poland: The Slow and Arduous Process towards Judicial Independence.” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Warsaw, Feb. 2025.
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